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We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of 
solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The 
solution concepts analyzed are rati~naliz~ability,  strong rationalizability, correlated 
equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of 
properties of  the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to 
illustrate definitions and concepts. 1.  Introduction 
The objective of the literature on the epistemic foundations of  solution concepts in games 
is to determine what assumptions on the beliefs and  reasoning of  the players are implicit  in 
various solution concepts. This is a recent line of inquiry in game theory and one that is gaining 
momentum. In this paper we give an introduction to the general approach and review some of the 
main contributions. We will provide a selective, rather than encompassing, survey. For a more 
ambitious and  more comprehensive  review of  the issues dealt  with  in  the  literature  on  the 
epistemic foundations of  game theory see Dekel and Gul (1997). 
Why worry about the epistemic foundations of  solution concepts? A common view is that 
results that  relate epistemic conditions  (such as common belief  in  rationality)  to  a particular 
solution concept help explain how introspection alone can lead players to act in accordance with 
it. The task of  this research program is to identify for any  game the strategies that might be 
chosen  by  rational  and  intelligent  players  who  know  the  structure  of  the  game  and  the 
preferences of their opponents and who recognize each other's rationality and knowledge. 
Although several of  the papers in the literature deal  with  the case of  knowledge  and 
common knowledge, we will take a more general point of  view where the primitive concept is 
that of  belief  (and knowledge can be viewed as a particular form of  belief: cf. Stalnaker, 1994, 
1  996). 
/ 
The paper is devoted mainly to the analysis of  normal-form (or strategic-form) games, 
1 
although the implications for extensive games are sometimes discussed.  In Section 2 we discuss 
1 
There  is, however, a  very recent literature that  deals  with  the epistemic foundations of  solution concepts  for 
extensive games, in particular backward  induction in perfect-information games.  See, for example. Aumann, Bayesian and qualitative frames and their properties and in Section 3 we use them to define the 
notion  of  a  model  for  a  normal-form  game.  In  Section  4  we  consider  the  notions  of 
rationalizability and strong rationalizability, while Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the epistemic 
foundations of  correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium, respectively. 
2.  Bayesian and qualitative frames and their properties 
2 
D  E F  I N  1 T  1 0  N  1 . An interactive Bayesianfiame (or Bayesian frame, for short)  is a 
tuple 
N = (1, ..., n} is a finite set of  individuals. 
3 
52  is a finite set of states (or possible worlds) .  The subsets of  52  are called events. 
4  z  E 52  is the "true" or "actual" state . 
for every individual i~ N, pi :  52 -+ A(52) (where A(52) denotes the set of  probability 
distributions over 52) is a function that specifies herprobabilistic beliefs,  satisfying the 
following property  [we use the notation piaa  rather than pi(a)]  : V a,  P  E  Q, 
(1995, 1996), Battigalli (1997), Battjgalli and Siniscalchi (1997), Ben  Porath  (1997), Stalnaker (1996, 1997), 
Stuart (1997). 
2 
For a similar definition see, for example, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Dekel and Gul (1997) and  Stalnaker 
(1994, 1996). 
3 
Finiteness of  52 is a common assumption in the literature (cf. Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995, 
Dekel and Gul, 1997, Moms, 1994, Stalnaker, 1994, 1996). Thus p.  E A(Q)  is individual i's subjective probability distribution at state a and condition 
1.Q 
(1) says that every individual knows her own beliefs. We denote by  11 pi = p.  11 the event 
1.a 
{a  E 51 :  pi," = piVa  }.  It is clear that the set  11 pi = piPw  11 :  w E Q } is a partition of  Q; it is 
often referred to as individual i's  typepartition. 
D  E F  I N  l T I0 N 2. Given a Bayesian frame 23,  its qualitativejFarne (or frame, for 
short) is the tuple Q = (N,  Q, r, {Pilie, ) where N, 9,  and r are as in Definition 1 and 
Q 
for every individual i~ N,  Pi : Q -+  2  \@ is i'spossibility correspondence, derived from i's 
5  probabilistic beliefs as follows: 
Pi(a)  == supp(pi,,). 
Thus, for every a€  Q,  Pi(a)  is the set of  states that individual i considers possible at a. 
R E MA R K 1 . It follows from condition (1) of  Definition 1 that the possibility 
correspondence of  every individual i satisfies the following properties (whose interpretation is 
given in Footnote 7): Qa,@  Q, 
Transitivity:  if  p E Pi(a) then  Pi(p) c  P,(a), 
Euclideanness:  if  p E Pi(a) then  Pi(a) 5 Pi(@. 
R E MAR  K  2  (Graphical representatiorl). A non-empty-valued and transitive 
e 
possibility correspondence P : 52 +  2  can be uniquely represented (see Figures below) as an 
4 
We have included the true state in the definition of an interactive Bayesian model in order to stress the 
interpretation of  the model as a representation of a particular profile of hierarchies of beliefs. 
5 
If  p~ A(Q), supp@) denotes the support of  p  , that  is, the set of states that are assigned positive probability by p. 6 
asymmetric directed graph  whose vertex set consists of disjoint events (called cells and 
represented as rounded rectangles) and states, and each arrow goes from, or points to, either a 
cell or a state that does not belong to a cell. In such a directed graph, or  E P(o) if  and only if 
either o  and o' belong to the same cell or there is an arrow from o,  or the cell containing o,  to 
a', or the cell containing a'. Conversely, given a transitive directed graph in the above class 
such that each state either belongs to a cell or has an arrow out of it, there exists a unique non- 
empty-valued, transitive possibility correspondence which is represented by the directed graph. 
The possibility correspondence is euclidean if  ,and only if  all arrows connect states to cells and 
no state is connected by an arrow to more than one cell. 
Finally, if - in addition - the possibility correspondence is reflexive, then one obtains a 
partition model where each state is contained in a cell and there are no arrows between cells. 
Q  Q 
Given a frame and an individual i, i's belief (or certainty) operator Bi : 2  +  2  is 
defined as follows: V E G Q, BiE = {wa Q : Pi(w) c E]. BiE can be interpreted as the event that 
(i.e. the set of  states at which) individual i believes  forsure that event E has occurred (i.e. 
7 
attaches probability 1 to E). 
Notice that we have allowed for false beliefs by not assuming reflexivity of  the 
possibility correspondences (V~E  Q, a E  Pi(a)), which -as is well known (Chellas, 1984, p. 
164) - is equivalent to the Truth Axiom (if the individual believes E then E is indeed true): 
6 
A directed graph is asymmetric if, whenever there is an arrow from vertex v to vertex v' then there is no arrow 
from v' to v. 
I  Thus Condition (I)  of Definition 1 can be stated as follows: V i~ N, Vae  R, lipi = p.  11 = Bill  pi = pi,,ll. 
1.a The common belief operator B,  is defined as follows. First, for every E c  $2, let BeE = 
n B.E, that is, BeE is the event that everybody believes E. The event that E is commonly 
1 
ieN 
believed is defined as the infinite intersection: 
The corresponding possibility correspondence P,  is then defined as follows:  for every a E Q, 
P,(a) = {a  E Q : a E TB*-I{~)}.  It is well known that P ,  can be characterized as the  transitive 
closure  of  U  f: ,  that is, 
kN 
V a$ E  Q,  (3  E P,(a)  if  and only if there is a sequence ( i,, ...  im) in N and a 
sequence (rlo,  q,, ..., q,)  in B  such ]that: (i) q, = a. (ii) qm  = p and (iii) for every k = 0. 
..., m- 1, qk+,€  Pi  (qk). 
k+  1 
Note that, although P,  is always non-empty-valued and transitive, in general it need not 
be euclidean (despite the fact that the individual possibility correspondences are; recall that -  cf. 
Footnote 7 - P,  is euclidean if  and only if  B,  satisfies Negative Introspection). 
With  reference  to  qualitative  frames,  we  now  define  events  that  capture  important 
properties of  beliefs. 
/ 
8 
It is well known (see Chellas, 1984, p. 164) that non-empty-valuedness  of  the possibility correspondence is 
equivalent to consktency of  beliefs (an individual cannot simultaneously believe E and not E): V E c_  52, 
B.E c  7B.7E  (where, for every event F, TF denotes the complement of  F). Transitivity of the possibility 
correspondence is equivalent to positive introspection of beliefs (if the individual believes E then she believes 
that she believes E):  V E E O,  BiE E BiBiE.  Finally, euclideanness of  the possibility correspondence is 
equivalent to negative infrospection of  beliefs (if the individual does not believe E, then she believes that she 
does not believe E): V E E 52,  7B.E c Bi-BiE. Event  Corresponding property of beliefs 
No  individual has false beliefs: 
For  every a E Q, a E T if and only if  no 
individual has any false beliefs at a (for every 
kN  and for every EcQ,  if  a~ BiE  then 
xE E) 
Common belief in no error: 
For  every a E St, a E B,T  if  and only if  at a it 
is common belief that no individual has any 
false beliefs 
Quasi-coherence of beliefs: 
For  every a E 8,  a E  Q if  and only if  at a it is 
sommonly possible that it is common belief 
:hat no individual has any false beliefs 
I'ruth of  common belief:  * 
XE  T  if  ;n3  ody  if  at a whatever is commonly 
xlieved is true (for every event E, if  a€  B,E 
:hen a€  E) 
Truth about common belief: 
x E TCB  if  and only if, for every event E and 
very individual i,  if, at a,  individual i 
believes that E is commonly believed, then, at 
a, E is indeed commonly believed (if 
a€  B,B,E  then a€  B,E) 
Negative Introspection of common belief: 
a E NI  if  and only if  -  for every event E - 
whenever at a it is not common belief that E, 
then, at a, it is common belief that E is not 
commonly believed (if a E 7B,E  then a 
E B,TB,E) 
The following propositions establish t.he relationship between some of  these properties. P  R 0  P 0  S  1 T 10 N 1 (Bonamo and Nehring, 1997a).  NI = TcB  n  B,TcB 
* 
P  R 0  P 0  S  1 T lo  N 2.  (Bonanno and Nehring, 1997b). T n  B,T  =  T n B,T,,  n  Q. 
3.  Models of normal-form games 
Throughout this paper we shall restrict: attention to finite games. A finite normal-form or 
strategic-form game is a tuple G = (N,  {SiliEN,  {uiliE  N)  where N = (1, 2, .  .  ., n) is a set of 
players, Si is the set of strategies of  player i and ui :  S +  R (where S = S, x .  .  . x Sn  and  [W is the 
set of  real numbers) is player i's von  Neumam Morgenstern payoff  (or utility) function.  This 
(standard) definition of  game  represents only  a  partial description  in  that  it  determines  the 
choices that are available to the players and the preferences that motivate the choices, but does 
not specify the players'  beliefs about each other or their actual choices. The notion of  model 
provides a way of completing the description. 
DEFlNlTlO  N  3.  Fix  a  normal-form  game  G.  A  model  of  G  is  a  pair 
?n  = (3,  {  0.1  ieN ) where 3 = ( N,  St , r,  { pi  lie, ) is a Bayesian frame and, for every player 
i, a, : St  -+  Si is a function that specifies for every state the choice made by player i at that state 
subject to the restriction that player i knows her own strategy: 
V ie N, V a,P  E  St,  if  piVa  = pi,  then  oi(a)  = oi(P). 
/ 
For every state w E St,  let o(o)  = (o,(w), ...,. on(w))  be the strategy profile played at o  and, for 
the players other than i. 
The addition of a strategy profile at every state is what gives content to the beliefs of the 
players. D E  F  I  N  IT  10  N 4.  Player i is rational at state a E  52  if her choice at a maximizes her 
expected utility, given her beliefs at a : for all x E Si, 
where s;  =a, (a) (recall that i's own strategy is  the same at every o E Pi(a)).  Let RAT, be the 
set of  states where player i is  rational and RAT = n  RAT, the event that all  players ire 
kN 
rational. 
EX  A M  P L E 1 . Figure lb  shows a model of  the two-person game illustrated in Figure 
la. Here we  have that RAT, = {z, B)  and  RAT,  = 52 ; hence RAT = {t,  P).  Note also that 
B,RAT = {t,  (31, B,RAT = {t}  and B,RAT = 0. 
Player 
1 
Player  2 
Figure  la Figure  lb 
R E MA  R K  3.  Note that, for every player i, BiRATi  = RAT,, that is, no player can 
9 
have false beliefs about her own rationality and if  she is rational then she knows it.  It follows 
that  B,RAT  G RAT, that is, if  it is common belief that all the players are rational, then they are 
10 
indeed rational.  On the other hand, as Example 1 shows, in general RAT $€  B,RAT. 
4.  Rationalizability and Strong Rationalizability 
The first  solution  concept  we consider  is  rationalizability  (Bernheim,  1984,  Pearce, 
1984).  / 
9 
If  a E BiRATi  then P E RAT,  for all  (3  E Ii(a). It follows that a E RATi since i's beliefs and  strategy are  the 
same at a as at any f3  E Ii(a).  The converse follows similarly. 
10 
For all i E N, B,RAT G BiRAT c  BiRATi  = RATI. D  E F l  N IT  I0  N 5.  For every player i, let A(Si) be the set of  probability distributions 
over Si (the set of  player i's mixed strategies). If  pi EA(S) and si E  Si, we denote by pi(s,) the 
probability assigned to si by pi.  A strategy si E  Si is strictly dominated by pi E A(Si) if, for all 
s  -I  . E S  -  i,  ui(p., S-i)  > ui(si, s-~),  where ui(#,  s-~)  =  pi (XI  ui  (x,s+) .  [For example, in the 
x€  s, 
game of Figure Za, strategy B of piayer 1 is strictly dominated by the mixture ($A, +D)]. Given 
1 
a game G, let G  be the game obtained by eliminating the strictly dominated strategies of  every 
2  1 
player; let G  be the game obtained from G  by eliminating the strictly dominated strategies of  - 
every  player, etc. Let G  be the game obtained from G after the iterative deletion of  strictly 
dominated strategies and  S-  the set of  strategy profiles of  G-.  The profiles in sW  are called 
12  3  - 
rationalizable. For the game of  Figure 2a, the games G  ,  G  and G  = G  are shown in Figures 
2b-d. In the game of  Figure la, S" = {(T,L),  (?',C), (B,L), (B,C)), since for Player 1 M is strictly 
dominated by T and -after deletion of  M - for Player 2 R becomes strictly domhated by both L 
and C. 
Player 2 
Figure  2a 
The game G: B is strictly dominated by ($ A, 2  D). Player 2 
a  b  c 
Figure  2b 
1 
The game G : now b is ~trictly  dominated by c. 
Player 2 
a  c 
Figure  242 
2  15 
The game G :  now C is strictly dominated by (  A,  D) 
Player 2 
/  a  c 
player 1  A rE/ 
D 
Figure  2d 
3  3 
The game G :  no strategy is strictly dominated; thus  G = G-  and s  = {(A,a), (A,c), (D,a), (D, c)). The following proposition was established by  Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) and 
proved more formally  in  an epistemic context  by Brandenburger and Dekel  (1987), Tan and 
Werlang (1988), Stalnaker (1994). Given a game G and a model  W  of  it, with slight abuse of 
notation  let S-  be  the event  that  a strategy  profile that survives  iterated  deletion  of  strictly 
Q) 
dominated strategies is played: S  = {w E P :  a(w) E sW}.  For example, in the model of  Figure 
lb, S-  =: {r, PI. 
P'ROPOSITION 3.  Let G be a game and W  a model of  it. Then 
That is, it' at a state there is common belief in rationality then the strategy profile played at that 
state is rationalizable and it is common belief that only rationalizable strategy profiles are played. 
Proposition 3 is a consequence of  the fact that a strategy si  E  Si is a best response to some 
belief  on  (probability distribution over) S-i if  and only  if  it  is not strictly dominated. Thus if 
a E B,RAT  then a E RAT (since B,RAT c  RAT: see Remark 3) hence no player is choosing 
a strateg:y which is strictly dominated in G. Since, for every i, B,RAT  BiRAT, at a every 
player believes that no player has chosen a strictly dominated strategy in G. Hence no player is 
1 
choosing a strategy which is strictly dominated in G ,  etc. 
The converse of  Proposition 3 does not hold. To see this, consider the following model of 
m  w 
the game of  Figure 2:  P  = {t  }, PI(%)  = P,(d  = {t  1, dt)  = (A,a). Then t E S  n B,S  but 
UT,  = 0 and  hence  B,RAT  7 0. The following  proposition  gives  a  partial  converse to 
Proposition 3 and shows that the notion of  common belief in rationality is not stronger than the 
notion 01'  rationalizability. 
P'ROPOSITION 4.  LetGbeagarneands~  ~~.Thenthereisarnodel  lll of  G 
such that: (1) t E B,RAT,  and (2) a(t)  = s. In constructing the model of  Proposil.ion 4 one can take 52  = SW  and use the fact that for 
m 
every strategy si of  player i in game G  there is a probability distribution over the strategies of 
the opponents relative to which si is a best reply. 
Propositions 3 and 4 are not based on any assumption of correctness of  players'  beliefs. 
Thus a player can be mistaken in the strategy choices andlor beliefs she attributes to the other 
players. A natural question to ask is whether ruling out incorrect beliefs further reduces the set of 
strategy profiles that can be played when there is common belief in rationality. The answer is 
affirmative, as Stalnaker (1994) shows (see also Bonanno and Nehring, 1996b). The following 
algoritllm is similar to the iterative deletion of  strictly dominated strategies, but differs from the 
latter in that it requires the iterative deletion ofprofiles rather than strhtegies. 
D E Fl  N IT  I0  N  6.  Given  a  nomal-form game  G,  a  strategy  profile  XE X  c  S  is 
inferior  relative to X  if  there exists a player i and a  (pr;ssib!y  mixed) strategy  pi of  player i 
(whose support can be any subset of S,, not necessarily the projection of  X onto Si)  such that: 
(2)  for all  E S-i such that (xi,  s- i) E  X,  ui(xi,  s-~)  I  ui(pi,  s-~). 
[Thus  if  X = S  then  x is  inferior if  and  only  if  there is  a  player i for  whom  xi is weakly 
k  dominated by some strategy si such that ui(si,  x-~)  > ui(x).] For every k 2 0, define S,  G S and 
0  k  k 
D:  E S  as follows:  S  = S,  D,  is  the set  of  profiles that  are inferior  relative  to S,  and 
-- 
SF'  =  S:  \ D:  . Let SF  = n  S: .  The strategy profiles in S,  are called sfrongly rationalizuble. 
EXAM  P L E  2.  For the game illustrated in Figure 3,  S:  = {(D,d), (D,a), (A,d)}. In 
fact, (A,  a) G  S:  since it is inferior relative to S (for Player 1  A is weakly dominated by D and 
ul((A,  a)) = 0  < ul((D, a)) = 1). Note that, on the other hand, s  = S (that is, all strategy profiles 
are rationalizable) since no player has any strictly dominated strategies. Player  2 
d  a 
Player 
1  A 
Figure  3 
EX  A M  P L E 3.  In the game of  Figure 4a, the first step in the algorithm leads to the 
profiles shown in Figure 4b [for Player 2 D is weakly dominated by E and for Player 1 C is 
weakly dominated  by  B],  the second step leads to the profiles shown in  Fip~re  4c  [now F is 
doiminated by E and C is dominated by A] and the third and final step to the profiles shown in 
Figure 4d  [now B is dominated by A]. Thus S:  = {(B,D), (C,D), (A,E), (A,F)). Note again that 
tha~t  S- = S since no player has any strictly dominated strategies. 
Player  2 
D  E  F 
Figure  4a 
S:  = S, D:  = {(A, D), (C, F)) Player  2 
D  E  F 
Player  2 
D  E  F 
Player  2 
D  E  F Given a game G and a model  ?7  of  it, with slight abme of  notation let S:  be the event 
that a strongly rationalizable strategy profile is played:  S:  = {w E B  : a(w) E S:  ). 
I'  R 0  P  0  S  I  T I 0  N 5 (Stalnaker, 1994; see also Bonanno and Nehring, 1  996b).  Let 
G be a game and  a model of  it. Then 
(1)  B,T  n B,RAT  B,S~  and 
That is, , f there is common belief in no error and common belief in rationality, then it is common 
belief that only strongly rationalizable profiles are played. If, furthermore, Truth of common 
belief also holds, then it is also true that the strategy profile actually played is strongly 
rationalizable. 
Proof.  Fix an arbitrary a E B,T n  B,RAT.  (1) For every o  E  P,(a) define j(o) as 
follows: j(o) = oo if  o(w) E  S:  and j(o) = k E N (where N is the set of  non-negative integers) if 
o(w) E  :i:  and o(w) e s:'  .  Clearly j(w) is well defined, since o(o) E S:  for all w E 8. Let k 
be the rn  inimum of  {j  (w)}_ p*,,  .  Suppose that P,(a)  B (w E 8  : o(w) E ST  1. Then k < rn. Let 
Eiz P,((x) be such that j(E)  = k.  Then ~(E)E  D: ,  that is,  o(E)  is inferior relative to S: . 
Thus there is a player i and a (possibly mixed) strategy pi  of  player i such that: 
ui(pi,  SJ  t  ui(oi(E),  si)  for all sPi  E  S-i such that (oi(G),  s-~)  E S: ,  and  (1) 
ui(pi,  S$a)  > ui(06  )).  (2) 
Since G E P,(a) and a E B,T,  6  E Pi(G  ), which implies that pi, (65) > 0. By definition of P*, 
Pi(EY)  P,(G).  By transitivity of  P,,  since iii' E P,(a),  P,(5)  P,(a). By definition of  5, 
1  I 
Stalnaker (1994, p. 63) incorrectly states the result as B*T n BLRAT C S:  . Bonanno and Nehring (1996b) give 
a counterexample and prove the results as stated in Proposition 5. P,(a)  {o  E  Q : &)E  sf  1. Hence Pi(G) r  {a  E 52 : o(o) E s  It follows from this and 
(1) and (2) that 
[recall that, for all y E Pi(G), ai(y) = ai(G)]  that is, player i is not rational at 6T .  Hence z  e 
B,RAT, ,  yielding a contradiction.  Part (2) follows directly from (1) and the definition of T . 
To see that, in general, B,T n B,RAT  $&  S:  consider the model of the game of  Figure 
3 illustrated in Figure 5.  It is easy to check that RAT = 52  (indeed, for x E ((3,  y),  a(x) is a Nash 
equilibrium). Hence at z (indeed at every state) it is common belief that all the players are 
rational  Furthermore there is common belief (at t,  indeed at every state) that no player has false 
beliefs, that is, B,T = 52.  However, while t E B,T n  B,RAT,  o(t)  = (A,a) P S:  . 
[ Insert Figure 51 
Figure  5 A partial converse to Proposition 5 is given by the following result. 
PROPOSITION 6.  Let Gbeagameands~  S:  .Thenthereis amodel  %'of  G 
such tha:: (1) t  E T n  B,T n  B,RAT, and (2) ~(t)  = s. 
The example of Figure 4 zhows that strong rationalizability is considerably stronger than 
rationalizability. To stress this point, consider the extensive game of Figure 6a, whose normal 
form is shown in Figure 6b. 
I  Insert Figure 6  1 
0  3  Player 1's payoff 
2  O  Player 2's payoff 
Figure  6a Player 2 
d  a 
Figure  6b 
- 
For the normal form, S  = S (that is, ali the strategy profiles are rationalizablej, since no 
strategy of any player is strictly dominated. Hence every outcome is compatible with common 
12 
belief in rationality. On the other hand, S:  = {(DG,  d), (DG, a), (DC, d), (DC, a))  and all the 
strategy profiles in S:  give rise to the Nash equilibrium outcome, namely the payoff vector 
(1,O). 
One might wonder whether the above example can be generalized to the claim that in the 
normal lorm of an extensive game with perfect information strong rationalizability implies the 
13 
play of  a Nash equilibrium outcome.  The answer is negative, as the following example 
12 
In the lirst round (AG, a) and (AC,a) are eliminated [the first because d weakly dominates a, the second because 
AG weakly dominates AC]; in the second round  (AG, d)  and  (AC, d)  are eliminated (because  1's strategy  is 
dominated by DG). 
13 
Stalnaker (1994,  p. 64, Theorem 4) incorrectly makes this claim. 14 
shows.  Figure 7b shows a model of the normal form of the extensive game of Figure 7a. At the 
true state the players choose (A, d, G),  which is not a Nash equilibrium; furthermore, there is no 
Nash equilibrium that gives rise to the outcome (2,2,2). Note that z  E T n  B,T n  RAT n 
B,RAT (in particular, Player 1's choice of  A is rational, 
a with equal probability). 
given his belief that Player 2 plays d and 
4  2  0  Player 1's payoff 
4  2  0  Player 2's payoff 
4  2  0  Player 3's payoff 
Figure  7a 
14 
This example is due to Battigalli (1996, private communication). For a similar example see Bonanno and Nehring 
(19S6b). 
2 1 'I: 
Figure  7b 
"he  extensive game of  Figure 7a has several  Nash equilibria and more than one Nash 
equilibr urn outcome. Does strong rationalizability imply Nash equilibrium outcome if  there is a 
unique such outcome? Once again, the answer is negative as the following modification of  the 
15 
game of  Figure 7a shows.  Here there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome, namely the payoff 
vector (7,7, 7, 7). Yet in the model shown in Figure 8b at z  the realized outcome is (2, 2, 2, 10) 
despite be  fact that z E T n  B,T n  RAT n  B,RAT. 
[  1nsert Figure 8  1 
15 
This e:;ample is due to Stalnaker (1996, private communication). Figure  8a 
0  Player 1's payoff 
0  Player 2's payoff 
0  Player 3's payoff 
0  Player 4's payoff fi.  Correlated equilibrium 
We now turn to the notion of correlated equilibrium which was introduced by  Aumam 
(1974, 1987). 
1)  E FI  N  IT  I0  N  7.  Let  G  be  a  normal-form  game.  A  correlated  equilibrium 
distribulion is  a probability distribution p over the set S of  strategy profiles such that, for every 
player i and every function di : Si +  Si 
X A M  P  L  E  4.  Consider the game of  Figure 9 (discussed by Auma~,  1974) and the 
following distribution: p(U.L) = p(D,R) = ).  Consider Player 1.  The left-hand side of  (2) is 
equal to  f 5 +  1 = 3. The possible functions d : {U, L) +  {U. L) are the identity function id 
(which gives the LHS of  (2)),  d,  (defined by dU(x)  = U for all x),  dD  (defined by dD(x)  = D for all 
X)  and dD  (defined by do(U) = D, do(D)  = U).  With d,  the RHS of  (2) is equal to )  5 + $ 0 = 
2.5, with d,  it is equal to f 4 + $ 1 = 2.5. Thus (2) is satisfied for Player 1. Similar calculations 
show that (2) is also satisfied for Player 2. Thus p(U,L) = p(D,R) = $ is a correlated equilibrium 
distribution. 
16 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  every  Nash  equilibrium  is  also  a  correlated  equilibrium. 
Furthermore, every convex combination of  Nash equilibria is also a correlated equilibrium. In a 
two-person zero-sum game all correlated equilibria are convex combinations of  pairs of  optimal 
(maxrnin and  minrnax) strategiep Thus  if  a  two-person  zero-sum game  has  a  unique  pure- 
strategy  Nash  equilibrium  s  then s  is  the  unique correlated  equilibrium  point.  However,  in 
general, there are correlated equilibria that are outside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria. 
16 
For example, if s is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, take p such that p(s) = 1. Aumann (1987) proved the following result. Let B be a set of states; for every player i 
let 3f be a partition of  $2  and denote by Hi(w) the element of the partition that contains state w. 
Let pi E A(Q) be individual i's "prior" such that pi(~i)  > 0 for all Hi E 3[;.  Let oi : Q +  Si be a 
function  that  specifies  i's  choice  of  strategy  at  every  state,  satisfying  the  property  that  if 
o'  E Hi(w) then ai(ol)  = o,(o),  that is, player i knows his own strategy. Let a = (a,, ..., an). 
Player i  is rational at  state a if  the strategy  he chooses at a maximizes his expected  utility 
calculated on the basis of hisposterior beliefs pi(-  I Hi(a))  defined by pi(u [ Hi(a))  =  p'(w)  -  - 
{(Hi (a)) 
''  (w)  if  w E Hi(a)  and pi(w  I  Hi(a))  = 0 if w e Hi(a):  C p'cr) 
=Hi(a) 
P  R 0  P 0  S IT  I0  N 7 (Aumann, 1987). If  the players have a common prior (i.e. if  there 
is a probability measure p on Q such that p, = ..  . = pn = p) and each player is rational at every 
state, then the probability distribution induced by p on S is a correlated equilibrium distribution. 
It is clear that the structure considered by Aumam is just a special case of  the notion of 
model g;iven in Definition  3. The extra assumptions  that Aumann  introduces are:  (I) that the 
possibility  correspondences give rise  to  partitions and  (2) that  the beliefs of  the players  are 
I I 
Harsanyi consistent, in the sense that they c2n be derived from a common prior.  An interesting 
question  is  therefore  whether  Aumam's  theorem  can  be generalized  to the case  where  the 
possibility  correspondences  are  non-partitional  (i.e.  where  some  players  might  have  false 
beliefs). In order to do so one fitst needs to have a local definition of  Harsanyi consistency  (i.e. 
17  1 
Note that the prior beliefs p  of player i postulated by Aumam play no role: only the posterior beliefs pi(-  IHi(w)) 
are n::levant.  Indeed, given a model of  a game according to Definition 3, one can obtain a  (local)  "prior" for 
player i by taking any convex combination of the different beliefs (types) of that player, that is, a prior of player i 
is any point in the convex hull of {p.  :  w E P,(t)}. 
1.0 of  the existence of  a common prior). However, obtaining a local formulation of  the notion of a 
common prior is only part of the difficulty. Recent contributions  (Gul, 1996, Dekel and Gul, 
1997, Lipman, 1995) have pointed out  that the meaning of  a  common prior in  situations  of 
incomplete  information  is  highly  problematic.  This  skepticism  can  be  developed  along  the 
followir~~g  lines. As Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed in their classic paper, the description of 
the "actual world" in terms of  belief hierarchies generates a collection of "possible worlds", one 
of  which  is  the actual  world.  This set  of  possible  worlds,  or states, gives  rise  to  a  formal 
similarity between situations  of  incomplete information and  those of  asymmetric information 
(where  there  is  an  ex  ante  stage  at  which  the  individuals  have  identical  information  and 
subsequently update their beliefs in response to private signals).  However, while a state in the 
latter represents a real contingency, in the former it is "a fictitious construct, used to clarify our 
understanding of  the real world" (Lipman, 1995, p.2), "a notational device for representing the 
profile c~d  infinite hierarchies of  beliefs" (Gul, 1996, p.  3).  As a result, notions such as that of  a 
comrnorli prior, "seem to be based on giving the artificially constructed states more meaning than 
they have" (Dekel and Gul, 1997, p.115). Thus an essential step in  providing a justification for 
correlated  equilibrium  under  incomplete  information  is  to  provide  an  interpretation  of  the 
commorl prior based on "assumptions that do not refer to the constructed state space, but rather 
are  assumed  to  hold  in  the  true  state",  that  is,  assumptions  "that  only  use  the  artificially 
constructed states the way they originated - namely as elements in a hierarchy of  belief" (Dekel 
and Gul,  1997, p.116). 
An interpretation of  the desired kind of  the common prior assumption under incomplete 
/ 
information was provided recently (Bonanno and Nehring, 1996a; see also Feinberg, 1995) in 
terms of a generalized notion of  absence of  agreeing to disagree a la Aumann (1976), called 
consistency of expectations. Dl E FI  N  IT  I0  N 8.  At state a there is Consistency of Expectations if  there do not exist 
random variables Yi : S2 +  W (i E N)  such that: (1) V me P,  (w) = 0,  and (2) at a it is 
ieN 
common belief that, for every individual i, i 's subjective expectation of  Yi is positive, that is, 
Consistency of  Expectations turns out to be equivalent to a particular local version of  the 
Common Prior Assumption defined as follows. 
D  E F l  N l  T  I0  N  9.  For every  ys  A(P), let HQCp (for Harsanyi Quasi  Consistency 
with respect to the "prior" y) be the following event: a E HQC  if  and only if 
I' 
(I)  VicN,  Vo,wt~P,(a),if  y(llpi=pi,wil)>O  thenpi,,(wl)=  p(d  if 
p(Ilpi  = pi,,Il) 
o'~  llpi = pi,,ll  and  p.  (a')  = 0 otherwise  (that is,  piSw  is  obtained from  p  by 
I,, 
18 
conditioning on Ilpi = p.  11 )  , and 
1.w 
If a E  HQCv, p is a local common prior at a.  Furthermore, let  HQC  =  U  HQC~  . 
p€A(Q) 
19 
P R 0  P 0  S  IT  I0  N 8.  At a Consistency of Expectations is satisfied if  and only 
if a E HQC. 
?he above proposition shows that HQC is the natural way of  expressing Harsanyi 
consistency locally. 
18 
Where, for every event E, p(E) =  p(o)  . Note that, for every w E S2  and i E N, w E  llpi  = pioil. 
oeE 
Thus p(w) > 0  implies p(llpi  = pi.ull)  > 0. 
19 
For a proof see Bonanno and Nehring (1996a). This result is a local version of Morris's (1994) characterization of 
no trade under asymmetric information. See also Feinberg (1995) and Samet (1996). Harsanyi Quasi Consistency may seem weaker than expected in that condition (2) of  its 
definition only requires the derived common prior to assign positive probability to some 
cornrno:~dy  possible state but allows the true state to be assigned zero "prior" probability. As 
illustratled in the example of Figure 9, Agreement and No Trade-type arguments cannot deliver 
more. 
not p  P 
1 Insert Figure 91 
Figure  9 
In this example, at the true state individual 1 wrongly believes that it is common belief that p, 
while individual 2 correctly believes that not p is the case and knows 1's incorrect beliefs. 
Expectation consistency is satisfied at the true state (as well as at (3). In fact, let Yl and Y2  be 
random variables on {r,  P) such that Y, = -Yl and suppose that r E Bell El > 011,  that is, at r it is 
common belief that individual 1's expectation of  Yl is positive. Then Y,((3) > 0, hence Y,@)  < 0. 
hus  p @  11 E,>  011, that is, at (3  ipdividual 2's expectation of  Y,  cannot be positive. Since 
(3 E P,(.c),  it follows that r & B,II  E,>  011. Thus Agreement is necessarily satisfied at r. By 
Proposition 7 there must be a p  such that r E HQCp.  Indeed such a local common prior is given 
by p(CJ)  = 1. Is Harsanyi Quasi Consistency an adequate epistemic basis for correlated equilibrium? 
Perhaps not too surprisingly in view of the previous example, Harsanyi Quasi Consistency is 
insufficient by  itself,  as demonstrated by the following example. Figures 10a and lob  show a 
two-person zero-sum game with a unique correlated equilibrium (B,R), and an epistemic model 
of it. 
Player 2 
Figure  1Oa Player 1: 
Player 2: 
1's strategy  : 
2's strategy  : 
In this example, at  (i) the players' beliefs satisfy Harsanyi Quasi Consistency (z E HQC  = 
P 
S2 where p(<)  = I), (ii) there is common belief in rationality (P,(z) = S2 and at every state each 
player's strategy is optimal given her beliefs) and (iii) no individual has any false beliefs. Yet at 
z  the players play (T,L) which is not a correlated equilibrium. 
Note that in the above example, although the derived common prior assigns zero 
probability to z, there is no sense in which the belief hierarchies described by the true state are 
"improbable" and constitute a null event. Indeed the actual beliefs of all players assign positive 
probability to z.  / 
The above example is in fact quite general. By a straightforward generalization of its 
construction any profile of correlated rationalizable strategies -  where one strategy is a unique 
best response to some distribution over correlated rationalizable strategies of the other players - can be realized at the true state z of a Bayesian frame where t  E HQC  (and no individual has 
false beliefs). 
What seems to go wrong in the example is that, while Player 2 believes Player 1 to be 
wrong at E, this does not show up as disagreement - and hence as a violation of  Harsanyi Quasi 
Consistency -  since Player 1 falseiy believes at E that there is agreement that the true state is c. 
Hence T,,  is violated at E, and therefore B,T,,  at t. 
Indeed -  in the absence of false beliefs at the true state - B,T,,  is exactly what needs to 
be added to HQC to ensure the play of  a correlated equilibrium strategy-profile, as the following 
theorem shows. 
To take account of  the incomplete information context, we call a strategy profile a 
correlated equilibrium if  it is played with positive probability in some correlated equilibrium (in 
the ordinary sense). 
P R 0  P 0 S  l T I0 N  9 (Bonanno and Nehring, 1997).  Fix an arbitrary finite normal- 
form game G and an arbitrary model of G such that: 
(1)  t  E T n  B,T,,  (the  actual  beliefs  of  the  players  are  correct  and  there  is 
common belief in Truth about common belief), 
(2)  TE  B,RAT,  (there is common belief in rationality) 
(3)  t  E HQC  (Harsanyi Quasi Consistency of  beliefs, that is, Agreement, is 
satisfied). 
Then  the  strategy  profile  associated  with  t (i-e. the  strategy  profile  actually  played)  is  a 
correlated equilibrium.  f 
On the other hand, as the example of  Figure 10 shows, if  (2) and (3) are satisfied and (1) 
is weakened to t  E T then the strategy profile associated with t  need not be a correlated 
equilibrium. R  E MA  R K  4. If condition (1) is weakened to t E NI (or, equivalently -  cf. 
Proposition 1 - t E To n  B,TcB) then the conclusion is that t  E B,CE,  where CE  is the event 
that a correlated equilibrium is played; that is, at the true state it is common belief that a 
correlated equilibrium is played. 
Thus one sees that once the rather mild-looking property of  Negative Introspection of 
common belief is satisfied, HQC is re-instated with the proper strength. 
A converse to Proposition 9 is given by the following result. 
P R 0  P 0  S  l T 10  N 1  0.  Let G be a game and p E A(S) a correlated equilibrium 
distribution. Then there exists a p E A(Q) and model  %'j' of G  such that 
(1) r E  T n  B,TcB n HQCp n B,RAT, (2) the distribution over strategy profiles induced by p 
restricted to {t  ) u  P,(t) coincides with p and (3) y(z) > 0 (so that the strategy profile xtually 
played is in the support of  p). 
6.  Nash equilibrium 
We  conclude  by  examining  the  epistemic  foundations  of  Nash  equilibrium,  which 
(together with its refinements) is without doubt the solution concept most used in applications. 
The above examples (e.g. Figure 7) show that common belief in rationality, even in the presence 
of  Truth  and  common  belief  in  Truth,  is  not  sufficient  to  guarantee  the  play  of  a  Nash 
equilibrium. There are further difficulties, however, due to the fact that some Nash equilibria 
involve mixed strategies. The models we have considered are models of  particular ways a game 
is played, and a particular pure strategy profile will always be realized at the true state of  the 
model  and,  indeed,  at  every  state.  The notion  of  model  (cf.  Definition  3)  incorporates  the 
assumption that each player knows the strategy he actually plays. One could easily weaken this assumption  by  allowing  players  to  delegate  their  choice  of  strategy  to  a  random  device. 
However, as Aumann (1987, p.15) observes, 
"In the traditional view of strategy randomization, the players use a 
randomizing device, such as a coin flip, to decide on their actions. This 
view  has  always  had  difficulties.  Practically  speaking,  the  idea  that 
serious  people would base important decisions on  the flip of  a coin  is 
difficult to accept. Conceptually, too, there are problems. The reason a 
player  must  randomize  in  equilibrium  is  only  to  keep  others  from 
deviating; for himself, randomizing is unnecessary." 
Elaborating on an idea of  Harsanyi (1973), Aurnann's suggestion was to view a mixed strategy 
of  player i not as an actual choice by player i but as an expression of  the uncertainty in the other 
players' mind concerning the choice made by  i. 
D E F  l  N  l T lo  N  1  0.  Given a model of  a game, we can extract a conjecture of  player i, 
defined  as a  function  xi  : Q  -+ A(SFi) that  associates  with  every  state a  the  probability 
distribution over S  induced  by  player i's  beliefs at a. For example, consider  the  zero-sum 
matching penny game of  Figure 1  la  and the model of  Figure 1 lb (taken from Stalnaker, 1994, p. 
59). The functions X, and x2 are shown in Figure 1  lb. At every state except E , Player 1 believes 
that Player 2 is choosing h an t with equal probability. At every state except 6,  Player 2 believes 
that  Player 1  is  choosing  H  an  T  with  equal  probability.  Note that  at  the  true state t the 
conjectures of  the players form a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that the mixed strategy 
of  Player 2 represents in fact the belief of  Player 1 and vice versa. Note also that at t common 
belief in rationality fails; in fact,  RAT, = Q  and RATz = {t,  y,  (3,  E) so that RAT = {t,  y,  (3,  E} 
and B,RAT = 0. 
I  Insert Figure 111 Player  2 
h  t 
Player 1: 
Player 2: 
Figure  lla 
'I:  Y  6(3  E 
Player 
'I:  Y  6(3  E 
The above example generalizes. Given a probability distribution p E A@,) denote by  I(x,  = p(I 
the event that Player 1 has conjecture p:  11 X, = pll = {W  E Q : x1  (a)  = p). Similarly, for 
q E US,)  let IIx,= 411  = {o  E 8  : x,(w) = q). P R 0  P 0  S  1 T  1 0  N 1  1 (Aumam and Brandenburger, 1995).  Let G be a two-person 
normal-form game and  Y??  a model of it. Let p E A(S2)  and q E A(Sl). Then for every 
a~ T n BIRAT n B2RAT n Blllx2=  qll nB211xl  = qll, the pair (xl(a),  x2(a))  is aNash 
equilibrium of G. 
When the number of players is greater than 2, complications arise due to the fact that the 
conjecture of player i is not a mixed strategy of another player, but a probability distribution on 
(n-1)-tuples of strategies of all the other players. However, i's conjecture does induce a mixed 
strategy for each player j # i (the marginal on S,  of  i's overall conjecture). However, different 
players other than j may have different conjectures about j.  Since j's  component of  the putative 
equilibrium is meant to represent the conjectures of  the other players  (other than j), and these 
may differ across j's opponents, it is not clear how j's component should be defined. Aumann 
and  Brandenburger  (1995)  however  show  that  if  the  players  have  a  common  prior,  their 
rationality is is mutually known and their conjectures are commonly known then for each player 
j, all the other players i agree on the same conjecture X. about j; and the resulting profile (x,, ..., 
J 
x,)  is  a  Nash  equilibrium.  The  authors  also  show,  through  a  series  of  examples,  that  the 
conditions stated are "tight", in the sense that if  any one of  them is not met then the claim is no 
longer true. 
7.  Conclusion 
The aim of  this paper has been to introduce the approach and some of  the main results of 
the recent literature on the epistemic foundations of  game theory. Not all the contributions were 
reviewed. In particular, we left out those papers that deal with extensive-form solutions concepts. 
Recent  papers have examined  the foundations  of  backward  induction  in  perfect  information 
games  (Aumam, 1995, 1996, Ben Porath, 1997, Stalnaker, 1996, 1997, Stuart 1997) and  of 
extensive form rationalizability (Battigalli 1997, Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1997). Several issues 
arise in this context, namely whether or not ex ante rationality is sufficient, whether an explicit 
analysis of  counterfactuals is required, etc. A careful review of this literature would require a 
paper as long as this one. References 
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